Logical Varieties in Normative Reasoning by Burgin, Mark et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Logical Varieties in Normative Reasoning 
 
                          Mark Burgin                             Kees (C.N.J.) de Vey Mestdagh  
              Department of Computer Science             Department of Legal Theory, Centre for Law&ICT 
             University of California, Los Angeles                            University of Groningen 
                 Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA                                         The Netherlands 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although conventional logical systems based on logical calculi have been successfully used in 
mathematics and beyond, they have definite limitations that restrict their application in many 
cases. For instance, the principal condition for any logical calculus is its consistency. At the 
same time, knowledge about large object domains (in science or in practice) is essentially 
inconsistent. Logical prevarieties and varieties were introduced to eliminate these limitations in 
a logically correct way. In this paper, the Logic of Reasonable Inferences is described. This 
logic has been applied successfully to model legal reasoning with inconsistent knowledge. It is 
demonstrated that this logic is a logical variety and properties of logical varieties related to 
legal reasoning are developed. 
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Introduction 
Although each domain of knowledge is more or less affected by the problem of 
inconsistent knowledge, this issue is particularly intense in the domain of legal knowledge, 
since it consists of the rules and procedures used to describe and solve legal conflicts, 
which presupposes contradictory and hence inconsistent perspectives. Human processors of 
legal knowledge follow formal and informal problem-solving methods in order to reduce 
the number of legal perspectives and eventually to decide, temporally and within a specific 
context, on a common perspective. The formal methods are based on universal properties of 
formally valid legal argument. The informal methods are based on legal heuristics 
consisting in tentative legal decision principles. The first category can be formalized by 
logic because it applies peremptorily to all legal perspectives. The second category cannot 
be fully formalized by logic because, although it is commonly applicable, it can always be 
refuted by a contradictory decision  principle and even by the mere existence of an 
underlying contradictory argument.  
To eliminate these limitations in a logically correct way, the concepts of a logical 
prevariety and variety were introduced [3, 4]. Logical varieties represent the natural 
development of logical calculi and thus, they show the direction in which mathematical 
logic will inevitably go. They generalize in a natural way the concept of a logical calculus 
and are more advanced systems of logic. Logical varieties include logical calculi as the 
simplest case. There are different types and kinds of logical varieties and prevarieties: 
Deductive or syntactic varieties and prevarieties. 
Functional or semantic varieties and prevarieties. 
Model or pragmatic varieties and prevarieties. 
Semantic logical varieties and prevarieties are formed by separating those parts that 
represent definite semantic units. In contrast to syntactic and semantic varieties, model 
varieties are essentially formal structures.  
Here we apply the theory of logical varieties to normative knowledge. 
Constructive practical implications of the theory of logical varieties are: 
1. Combination of different logical tools, e.g., different types of inference, and 
approaches/perspectives in one system. 
2. Achieving multifuctionality of logic. The process is similar to trends in information 
technology: simple calculators do only calculations with numbers, while computers are 
multifunctional being able, for example, to work with texts and images; now cell phones 
become more and more multifunctional. 
3. Provide efficient means to work with information that has been traditionally treated 
as inconsistent. 
Cognitive practical implications of the theory of logical varieties: 
1. Better and more precise description of reality. 
2. Better and more precise understanding of reality. 
To represent legal reasoning with formalized structures in efficient legal expert systems 
the Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI) has been developed and successfully applied in 
the legal knowledge domain [10 – 13].  
In this paper, it is demonstrated that LRI is a logical variety and properties of logical 
varieties related to legal reasoning are studied.  
 
1. Logical varieties  
Syntactic varieties and prevarieties are built from logical calculi as buildings are built 
from blocks. That is why, we, at first remind the concept of a logical calculus.  
Let us consider a logical language L and is an inference language R. 
Definition 1.1.  A syntactic or deductive logical calculus, usually called logical 
calculus, is a triad (a named set) of the form 
                                                   C = (A, H, T)         
where H ⊆ R and A, T ⊆ L, A is the set of axioms, H consists of inference rules (rules of 
deduction) by which from axioms the theorems of the calculus are deduced, and the set of 
theorems T is obtained by applying algorithms/procedures/rules from H to elements from A.  
Let K be some class of syntactic logical calculi, R be a set of inference rules, and F be a 
class of partial mappings from L to L.  
Definition 1.2.  A named set (triad) M = (A, H, M), where A and M are sets of 
expressions that belong to L (A consists of axioms and M consists of theorems) and H is a 
set of inference rules, which belong to the set R, is called: 
(1) a projective syntactic (K,F)-prevariety if there exists  a set of logical calculi  Ci = 
(Ai , Hi , Ti )  from K (Ai consists of axioms and Mi consists of theorems of the logical 
calculus  Ci) and a system of mappings fi : Ai  → L and gi : Ti  → L   (i ∈ I)  from  F  for 
which the equalities A =  ∪i∈I fi(Ai), H =  ∪i∈I Hi  and   M =  ∪i∈I gi(Ti) are valid (it is 
possible that  Ci = Cj   for some i ≠ j).  
(2) a syntactic K-prevariety if it is a projective syntactic (K,F)-prevariety where all 
mappings fi  and gi that define M are inclusions, i.e., A = ∪i∈I Ai and M = ∪ i∈I Ti ; 
(3) a projective syntactic (K,F)-variety with the depth k if it is a projective syntactic 
(K,F)-prevariety and for any i1 , i2 , i3 , … , ik ∈ I either the intersections ∩j=1k fij(Aij) and 
∩j=1kgij(Tij) are empty or there exists a calculus C = (A, H, T) from K and  projections f: A 
→ ∩j=1k fij(Aij) and  g: T  → ∩j=1k gij(Tij) from  F;   
(4) a syntactic K-variety with the depth k if it is a projective syntactic (K,F)-variety 
with depth k in which all mappings fi  and gi that define M are bijections on the sets Ai and 
Ti , correspondingly. 
(5)  a (full) projective syntactic (K,F)-variety if for any k > 0, it is a projective syntactic 
(K,F)-variety with the depth k; 
(6)  a (full) syntactic K-variety if for any   k > 0,  it  is  a K-variety with the depth k.  
We see that the collection of mappings fi and gi makes a unified system called a 
prevariety out of separate logical calculi Ci , while the collection of the intersections ∩j=1k 
fij(Aij) and ∩j=1kgij(Tij) makes a unified system called a variety out of separate logical 
calculi  Ci . For instance, mappings fi and gi allow one to establish a correspondence 
between norms (laws) that were used in one country during different periods of time or 
between norms (laws) that are used in different countries. 
The main goal of syntactic logical varieties is in presenting sets of formulas as a 
structured logical system using logical calculi, which have means for inference and other 
logical operations. Semantically, it allows one to describe a domain of interest, e.g., a 
database, knowledge of an individual or the text of a novel, by a syntactic logical variety 
and then to divide the domain in parts that allow representation by calculi. 
In the case of projective syntactic (K,F)-prevarieties, the set M of logical formulas from 
a logical language L is represented by selecting a system of calculi Ci from K and mapping 
theorems of these calculi into L so that all their images cover M. These calculi Ci may have 
different languages Li , different axioms (assumptions for reasoning) Ai and/or different 
rules of inference Hi . However, all languages Li are amalgamated in L and all rules of 
inference Hi are fused in R and represented in H. For instance, it is possible that L = Lc ∪ 
LT ∪ LN where Lc is the language of the classical predicate calculus, LT is the language of 
the tense logic, LN is the language of the logic of norms. 
Besides, axioms (assumptions for reasoning) Ai of the calculi Ci represent the 
generating base (assumptions for reasoning) A of the syntactic variety M in a similar way. 
Syntactic K-prevarieties have a better representation by calculi Ci from K. Namely, they 
are unions of these calculi Ci from K.  
Projective syntactic (K,F)-varieties add one important feature to properties of projective 
syntactic (K,F)-prevarieties. Namely, not only components Ci of the covering { Ci ; i ∈ I} 
are calculi from K but also all intersections of the component images in L are presented by 
calculi Ci from K. 
Syntactic K-varieties properties of projective syntactic (K,F)-varieties and syntactic K-
prevarieties. Namely, they are unions of these calculi Ci from K and intersections of these 
calculi Ci are also calculi from K.  
 Definition 1.3. The calculi Ci used in the formation of the prevariety (variety) M are 
called components of M.  
Inference in a logical variety M is restricted to inference in its components because at 
each step of inference, it is permissible to use only rules from one set Hi applying these 
rules only to elements from the set Ti . 
An interesting type of logical varieties was developed in artificial intelligence and large 
knowledge bases. As Amir and McIlraith write [1], there is growing interest in building 
large knowledge bases of everyday knowledge about the world, comprising tens or 
hundreds of thousands of assertions. However working with large knowledge bases, 
general-purpose reasoning engines tend to suffer from combinatorial explosion when they 
answer user's queries. A promising approach to grappling with this complexity is to 
structure the content into multiple domain- or task-specific partitions. These partitions 
generate a logical variety comprising the knowledge base content. For instance, a first-order 
predicate theory or a propositional theory is partitioned into tightly coupled subtheories 
according to the language of the axioms in the theory. This partitioning induces a graphical 
representation where a node represents a particular partition or subtheory and an arc 
represents the shared language between subtheories.  
The technology of content partitioning allows reasoning engines to improve the 
efficiency of theorem proving in large knowledge bases by identifying and exploiting the 
implicit structure of the knowledge [1,8]. The basic approach is to convert a graphical 
representation of the problem into a tree-structured representation, where each node in the 
tree represents a tightly-connected subproblem, and the arcs represent the loose coupling 
between subproblems. To maximize the effectiveness of partition-based reasoning, the 
coupling between partitions is minimized, information being passed between nodes is 
reduced, and local inference within each partition is also minimized.  
The tools and methodology of content partitioning and thus, implicitly of logical 
varieties are applied for the design of logical theories describing the domain of robot 
motion and interaction [1]. 
Concepts of logical varieties and prevarieties provide further formalization for local 
logics of Barwise and Seligman [2], many-worlds model of quantum reality of Everett [5, 
6], and pluralistic quantum field theory of Smolin related to the many-worlds theory  [9].  
 
2. Reasoning in legal systems  
Legal, or more broadly, normative knowledge is used to infer the normative 
characteristics of actual social situations. Legal knowledge is a subdivision of normative 
knowledge that is used in the formal legal (judicial) subsystem of social systems, such as 
countries, organizations or coalitions. Normative knowledge encompasses both normative 
opinions (know what) and the normative procedures (know how) that are used to infer these 
normative opinions. The normative characteristics that are inferred represent the mutual 
expectations of people about the conduct of others (rules of conduct). In a formal legal 
context, these expectations are commonly labeled as ‘rights’ (to the realization of conduct 
of others) and ‘obligations’ (of others to behave in agreement with the expectations).  
Normative opinions range from informal to formal. On the informal side we find moral 
principles, social scripts, protocols, (technical) instructions, rules of thumb, rules of play 
etc. On the formal side we find legislation, legal principles, jurisprudence, policy rules etc. 
Normative opinions can be of a general (uninstantiated) and of a specific (instantiated) 
character. Normative procedures consist of (1) procedures to list all the normative opinions 
about a given situation that can be inferred from the given situation combined with the set 
of pre-existing normative opinions of the parties concerned and (2) procedures to reduce 
the number of normative opinions about the given situation to a (local and temporal) 
common opinion for (not necessarily of) the parties concerned. Both procedures involve 
legal reasoning. The second procedure also involves legal decision-making. Legal 
reasoning in the first class of procedures is concerned with the inference of normative 
opinions about the given situation. We will refer to this as “the object level”. Legal 
reasoning in the second class of procedures is concerned with the inference of normative 
opinions about the reduction of normative opinions (e.g. “the judge is obliged to decide for 
a legally valid opinion”). We will refer to this as “the meta level”. In the next paragraphs, 
we will discuss the properties of legal knowledge that should be taken into consideration in 
order to be able to develop a tenable computational model. 
Legal or normative reasoning has no unique qualities compared to reasoning in other 
domains of knowledge. Normative characteristics of social situations are inferred by plain 
logical deduction from (agreed or disputed) facts and normative opinions. Normative 
opinions can have facts (e.g. the conduct of others) or opinions as their subject. In the 
former case, expectations about the conduct of others in general are inferred (the object 
level). In the latter case, expectations about the application of opinions are inferred (the 
meta level). To be precise: at both levels, expectations about the conduct of others are 
inferred. At the object level this relates to conduct in general, while at the meta level it 
relates to conduct concerning the application of normative opinions. Consequently, there is 
no formal difference between legal reasoning at the two levels.  
One could think that an idiosyncrasy of legal reasoning may be found in the above 
addition “agreed or disputed”, but disagreements about facts and opinionated qualifications 
are part of every domain of knowledge. However, the representation of disagreements about 
facts and conflicting opinions and the (local and temporal) resolution of these 
disagreements and conflicts is the aim of, and therefore essential to, the practical 
application of legal knowledge. What is special about this particular aim is the local and 
temporal character of the resolution. The aim of the application of legal knowledge in a 
social situation is to decide on a common perspective in order to be able to act in a 
coordinated manner. The decision does not (necessarily) cause facts or individual opinions 
to change; it simply introduces a new fact, that of the common perspective. It is even 
necessary for all the disputed facts and opinions to be represented permanently because they 
are not only part of the decision-making process but remain part of the legitimation of the 
common perspective. 
The continued representation of disputed facts and opinions, even after a decision 
regarding a common perspective has been made, is not only essential to the legitimation of 
the decision. Legal knowledge is ultimately dynamic, meaning not only that people can  
change their opinion sequentially over time but that they can also hold different opinions in 
parallel at any given time. Normative opinions change and differ with time and given 
context. A common perspective only holds for the given situation of the parties concerned. 
Furthermore, the parties need not merely maintain their individual opinions in parallel with 
the common, decided opinion, but they may also immediately renounce the common 
opinion either individually or in unison. It is not uncommon that parties decide to act 
contra legem, for example to maintain the status quo or just to avoid a bagatelle. 
The world is not transformed into a consistent state as a consequence of the completion 
of the legal proceedings. Agreement is reached within one context, at one moment, in order 
to complete a singular legal transaction (e.g. a verdict). The judge and all other parties can 
stick to their original opinions in every other transaction, but they may and frequently will 
also change their opinions in the aftermath of legal proceedings. People may also continue 
to act in violation of a verdict. A verdict may be overruled or be revised. And even the law 
may change. 
The preceding description of legal knowledge and legal reasoning renders any 
normative opinion relatively legally valid (i.e. legally valid within its own context) and thus 
allows the existence of contradictory opinions. Fortunately, there are some universal 
constraints that reduce the number of opinions that can be taken into consideration. These 
constraints are based on the legitimation principle, which is universally acknowledged in 
legal disputes and which comprises amongst others the principles of legal justification and 
legal rationality. The principle of legal justification demands that each derived normative 
opinion is based on a complete argument, meaning that the opinion reached is supported by 
facts and grounded opinions. The principle of rationality comes down to the demand that 
the derived opinion and the argument it is based on are non-contradictory. Psychologically, 
these demands amount to common characteristics of human cognition. Formally, they boil 
down to the requirements of valid deduction and consistency. A logic modeling legal 
reasoning should abide by these requirements. The formal demands of valid deduction and 
consistency of opinions and their justifications reduce the number of formally valid 
opinions (reasonable inferences), but in most cases they do not enable a reduction to a 
single common opinion. Unfortunately, there are no further formal (absolute) criteria to 
reduce all the remaining alternative formally valid legal opinions to a single common 
opinion. Logical varieties can be used to model this fundamental inconsistency in a 
logically correct way.  
3. The logic of reasonable inferences  
The Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI) models legal reasoning, using the language 
of classical first-order predicate calculus, as this language seems powerful enough to 
express legal rules and factual situations without losing any relevant information [10–13].  
The classical definition of semantic derivability seems to be a fairly reasonable one, but 
it enjoys a peculiar property if theories are allowed to be inconsistent: anything can then be 
derived from them! Thus, if Γ is an inconsistent theory, then Γ  φ for any φ ∈ . Theories 
like this are called trivial, and logics that render inconsistent theories trivial are called ex-
plosive.  
 Explosiveness conflicts with any intuitive understanding of derivability. We surely 
do not want to conclude from an inconsistent theory on environmental law that the 
obligation to possess an environmental permit implies that one does not perform activities 
related to the environment, or that all farmers are civil servants. One is not liable to accept 
any derivation of a formula containing concepts not present in the theory from which it was 
derived.  
Inconsistent theories, which model the body of rules of law, have their use in legal 
reasoning, as it is demonstrated in Section 2. Therefore, a relevant definition of semantic 
derivability must surely avoid the property of predicate calculus derivability concerning 
inconsistent theories by responding to inconsistent theories along the lines described above. 
This can be achieved by demanding that every justification for a derived conclusion is 
internally consistent, where a justification is the set of rules and observations (facts) used to 
derive the conclusion. This demand is a straightforward observation taken from legal 
reasoning theory.  
These constraints lead to the definition of a new (non-explosive) semantic derivability 
relation r for the Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI). The language of the LRI is the 
language of the classical first-order predicate calculus. However, in a conventional logic 
(logical calculus), rules of inference depend only on the form of logical formulas. Thus, the 
LRI is not a conventional logic because its rules depend on partitioning of its language. We 
show that the LRI is a logical variety.  
Definition 3.1. A domain of rules, or a reasonable base, in  is a tuple ∆ defined as  
∆ = (A, H) 
where A and H are sets of wffs in , such that A is the consistent set of axioms for a 
reasonable theory, and H is the set of (tentative) assumptions (hypotheses).  
The assumptions model the rules of law that may or may not be applied in a given 
factual situation to derive a conclusion and contain all normative or subjective 
classifications of the factual situation. The axioms are intended to be valid in every 
justification and thus, restrict the number of possible justifications. These axioms represent 
the ascertained facts and previously ascertained conclusions (the permanent database in any 
implementation). 
 Definition 3.2. A position (or conviction) ф within a domain of rules ∆ = (A, H) is a 
consistent set of wffs defined as  
ф = A ∪ H′ 
where H' ⊆ H. 
Definition 3.3. A position (conviction) ф within a domain of rules ∆ = (A, H) is called 
logically closed if it is a predicate calculus.  
Thus, a position is a set of rules taken from the domain of rules and represents a 
conviction of an individual or a group of people. Note that all positions should at least 
contain all axioms of the domain of rules and each position is consistent by definition. This 
shows that all logically closed positions form a logical variety in which all intersection are 
equal to A. 
Let ∆ be a domain of rules. Define a new semantic derivability-relation r as :  
∆ r φ 
iff there exists a position ф within ∆ which satisfies  
ф  φ 
where  is the normal predicate calculus semantic derivability relation. If ∆ r φ holds, 
φ is said to be a reasonable inference from the domain of rules ∆.   
This the exact form of inference in logical varieties.  
We can paraphrase this definition by stating that a wff can reasonably be inferred from 
an inconsistent set of wff iff it is derivable (in the normal predicate calculus sense) from a 
consistent subset of this set which contains at least the axioms. Note that if a domain of 
rules ∆ = (A, H) is consistent (i.e. if A ∪ H = Γ is consistent), then ∆ r φ ⇔ Γ  φ behaves 
exactly like  when applied to consistent theories.  
In this setting, a justification for a conclusion φ derived from a domain of rules ∆ is a 
minimal position (with respect to set-inclusion) J within ∆ such that J  φ. This definition 
is based on the more intuitive definition as a set of rules and statements about the factual 
situation used to draw the conclusion. Note that a justification needs not be unique but it is 
always consistent, thus, satisfying our constraints.  
A context in ∆ is the union of n simultaneously derived conclusions ψi and their justifi-
cations Ji derived from ∆, i.e. a context is the set of tuples { (ψi , Ji) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.  
A context in ∆ is called consistent if the justifications Ji derived from ∆ satisfy the 
following condition: 
The union ∪i=1n Ji  is consistent 
This guarantees that simultaneously derived conclusions are not based on mutually 
inconsistent positions, and that holds.  
Definition 3.4. A reasonable theory Th ∆ with a base ∆ = (A, H) is the set of all wffs 
deducible in LRI from ∆, i.e.,   
Th ∆ = { φ ∈ ; there is a position ф ∈ ∆, such that ф  φ} 
 This shows that any reasonable theory Th ∆ is a deductive logical variety V of the form                                                                   
V = {Ci ; i ∈ I and there is a position ф, such that Ci = (ф, d, Tф) } 
where d is the set of all deduction rules of classical the first-order predicate calculus and 
Tф is the set of all formulas deducible from the position ф by rules from d. 
 
4. Compatibility in logical varieties  
An important problem of logic is to combine logics and in particular, to include a 
system of calculi into one calculus. Gabbay [7] writes that “the problem of combining 
logics and systems is central for modern logic, both pure and applied. The need to combine 
logics starts both from applications and from within logic itself as a discipline. As logic is 
being used more and more to formalize field problems in philosophy, language, artificial 
intelligence, logic programming, and computer science, the kind of logics required becomes 
more and more complex.” Logical varieties give a relevant context for solving this 
problem. Here we consider only deductive varieties. 
Let K be a class of logical calculi and M = {Ci ; i ∈ I} be a deductive variety (K-
variety).  
Definition 4.1. A logical variety M is called: 
a) Discrete if its components are disjoint; 
b) Classical if all its components are classical deductive calculi; 
c) Connected if any two of its components have a non-void intersection;  
d) Compatible (K-compatible) if it is a subset of a consistent calculus (of a calculus 
from K). 
Definition 4.2. A set of components {Ci ; i ∈ J} of M are called compatible if the 
subvariety of M generated by these components is compatible 
Lemma 4.1. For any deductive variety M, there is a discrete deductive variety DM such 
that their upper levels are equal, i.e., T(M) = T(DM)..  
Proposition 4.1. If M is compatible (K-compatible), then DM is compatible (K-
compatible).  
Theorem 4.1. For any number n > 1 there is a classical connected deductive logical 
variety M with n components such that any n - 1 components of M are compatible, but M is 
not compatible.  
Remark 4.1. The condition that the variety is classical is essential.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Logical varieties and prevarieties eliminate certain limitations of conventional logical 
systems based on logical calculi, particularly, their explosiveness. The Logic of Reasonable 
Inferences is a logical variety and consequently has been successfully used to formally 
describe inconsistent normative knowledge and to develop legal decision support and 
expert systems. 
Legal decision support systems and expert systems based on LRI, logical varieties and 
procedures of reasonable inference might be useful to judges, jurors, lawyers, detectives, 
and attorneys. 
For instance, a Legal Decision Support System can help jurors and judges to find if 
witnesses are consistent in their depositions, if statements of different witnesses are 
compatible, if versions of persecution and defenders are consistent, and which of these 
versions is more grounded. A Legal Decision Support System can help a judge to find what 
laws and/or what precedence cases are more compatible with the given case. A Legal 
Decision Support System can help detectives and attorneys to find which conjectures are 
compatible with evidence and with one another and which of these conjectures are more 
grounded. 
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